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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3256 
 ___________ 
  
 ELVIRA GUALLPA MAYANCELA DE PERGUACHI;  
 MANUEL IGNACIO PERGUACHI CUJI, 
       Petitioners 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency Nos. A088-231-158; A088-231-146) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2012 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion file: March 22, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioners, Elvira Guallpa Mayancela de Perguachi and Manuel Ignacio 
Perguachi Cuji, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or 
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“Board”) final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review.  
I. 
 Cuji and Perguachi are natives and citizens of Ecuador who have been in the 
United States unlawfully since 1994 and 1996, respectively.  In June 2007, the 
government charged them each with removability pursuant to INA § 
212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] as aliens present without being 
admitted or paroled.  Petitioners conceded removability as charged, but sought 
cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)] on the ground 
that their three-year-old son, who is a United States citizen, has medical problems 
and would suffer undue hardship if they were forced to return to Ecuador.   
Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioners’ 
applications for cancellation of removal.  The IJ explained that, in order to be 
eligible for that discretionary relief, Cuji and Perguachi were required to show that 
their removal “would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to 
their son.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).  The IJ noted that, although Petitioners had 
testified that their son’s health required regular monitoring, they had failed to 
submit any medical records or provide a doctor’s report “with a prognosis or 
diagnosis or indication that the child could not receive appropriate medical care in 
Ecuador.”  (AR000153).  Petitioners sought administrative review of the IJ’s 
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decision, but, by decisions dated March 31, 2009, the Board dismissed their 
appeals.     
On July 19, 2010, over fifteen months after the Board entered its final orders 
of removal, Petitioners filed a consolidated motion to reopen.  In the motion, 
Petitioners claimed that their former attorney had rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to ascertain that Perguachi’s parents were lawful permanent residents 
and could therefore serve as an alternative basis for their cancellation applications.  
Petitioners claimed that Perguachi’s parents had been lawful permanent residents 
since July 27, 1998, that they live half a block away from her in Newark, and that 
she takes care of them on a “day-to-day basis.”  (AR000039-40.)      
In a decision dated February 8, 2011, the Board denied Petitioners’ motion 
to reopen.  The Board explained that, although Petitioners had substantially 
complied with the procedural requirements for an untimely motion to reopen based 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, see In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
637 (BIA 1988), they had failed to demonstrate either prejudice or due diligence so 
as to warrant equitable tolling. See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2007).   
On March 9, 2011, Petitioners filed a letter brief with the BIA requesting 
reconsideration of its February 8, 2011 order.  Petitioners’ letter brief consisted of 
the following single paragraph: 
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In reopening, the [BIA] concluded that the [Petitioners] failed 
to show due diligence because the Motion to Reopen was not filed 
until July 27, 2010 when the record shows that the [Petitioners] first 
became aware of Mr. Perez’s ineffective assistance in March of 2009.  
However, this delay cannot be fairly ascribed to the [Petitioners].  The 
[Petitioners] exercised all the diligence that could possibly be 
expected of them in this case.  
 
(AR000011.)   
 By order entered July 21, 2011, the BIA denied the motion.  The Board 
found that Petitioners had failed to specify any error of fact or deficiency of law 
with respect to its due diligence determination, see 8 U.S.C.A. 1229a(c)(6)(C), and 
had not even addressed the alternative basis for its ruling on reopening, i.e., its 
prejudice finding.   
    On August 22, 2011, Petitioners filed the present petition for review.1
II. 
        
On appeal, Petitioners challenge the BIA’s February 8, 2011 decision 
denying their consolidated motion to reopen.  Specifically, they argue that the 
agency erred in concluding that they had failed to demonstrate either prejudice or 
due diligence to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  We cannot, 
however, review the BIA’s February 8, 2011 decision denying Petitioners’ motion 
to reopen because they did not file their petition for review within thirty days of 
that order.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (providing for 30-day deadline in which to 
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
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file petition for review); Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 395 (1995) (explaining that 
a motion to reopen or reconsider does not toll the time to file a petition for review 
of the BIA’s underlying order).   
While the petition for review is timely with respect to the BIA’s July 21, 
2011 decision denying reconsideration, Petitioners neglect to sufficiently challenge 
that decision on appeal; although their brief contains passing references to the 
BIA’s decision, they have failed to make any specific arguments concerning the 
denial of reconsideration.  Therefore, any challenge to the BIA’s July 21, 2011 
decision has been waived.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 140 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2011).  In any event, we have reviewed the BIA’s order and conclude that it was 
not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 
265 (3d Cir. 2008).  As the BIA noted, Petitioners failed to specify any error of fact 
or law in its prior decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), and instead simply 
declared—without any elaboration—that the delay in filing the motion to reopen 
“cannot be fairly ascribed to them.”  (AR000003.) 
III. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.2
                                                 
2 Petitioners’ “Motion for Judicial Notice and to Supplement the Record of 
Proceedings” is denied.  Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), we are precluded 
from considering evidence that is not part of the administrative record.   
     
